U6660-8-F

ISBN 0-930885-03-1

BEBR Monographs

ISSUE NO. 3

Bureau of Economic and Business Research

University of Florida

CUBAN IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS IN FLORIDA AND THE UNITED STATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY

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Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Florida

November, 1985

BEBR MONOGRAPHS

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ISBN 0-930885-03-1

Cover Photograph: Metro Dade County Department of Tourism

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Introduction

In a few short months in 1980, approximately 125,000 Cubans arrived in South Florida. The impact of this influx, now referred to as the Mariel Boatlift/Freedom Flotilla, upon Florida communities can be explained from past immigrations. Although an abundance of coverage in the media has concentrated upon the Mariel immigrants, little information has been made available about the entire Cuban immigration process.

It is important to describe the immigration picture in some detail and to present the characteristics of the immigrants from Cuba in order to gain the broader perspective of the total impact and potential roles of Cuban immigrants in Florida. Lessons learned from this particular immigration process should lead to understanding of the potential economic, political and cultural consequences of all immigration to Florida and the United States. Such knowledge should also aid in reformulation of immigration policy.

Cuban immigration to the United States has a long history. Prior to 1959, political instability in their island nation always contributed to the flow of Cubans to the U.S., but the greatest numbers came as a result of the development of Florida itself.

Although to date the Cubans have settled mostly in Dade County and its largest city, Miami, all of South Florida has also felt the impact of migration and will continue to feel it in the future. In this monograph, "Dade" or "Miami/ Dade" refers to the county that is also the Census-designated Miami-Hialeah Metropolitan Statistical Area. The term "City of Miami" refers to the largest incorporated area of Dade County, while the term "South Florida" refers to the larger region of Broward, Dade, Monroe and Palm Beach counties.

Chapter 1.—Immigration Policy

Immigration is one of the most perplexing problems facing not only Florida and the United States, but also the entire international community. Florida's recent experiences dramatize its significance, and what has been said about the U.S. is of particular importance to Florida:

> Recent events in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean together with an apparently worldwide desire on the part of more people to improve their lot in life by migration create new demands on most developed countries of the world, in particular the U.S. The potential increases in immigration combined with the possible natural decrease are forcing the U.S. to face up to certain unpleasant choices. (Leon Bouvier 1981.)

Similarly, another astute scholarly observer of the immigration issue speaks of the festering dilemmas:

> There is now a growing realization that immigration and refugee issues may prove to be among the most important and troubling world problems of the next decade. The recent large flows of refugees or expellees from Indochina, Afghanistan and Cuba, all typically treated as short-term crises, instead may be harbingers of long-term trends of profound proportions.
>
> . . . Immigration and refugee policy is of special and rapidly growing political importance in the United States. The debate is an increasingly unpleasant one, with anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments apparently strong and growing. (Michael Teitelbaum 1980.)

Given the high birth and growth rates of those very countries that would send future immigrants to Florida to relieve their own economic pressures, the state will remain a prime destination for many thousands of immigrants in the next decades.

No immigration calls attention to the pressure upon Florida and other high-growth areas more dramatically than that of the Cubans. In fact, their most recent influx may have pointed up, more than any other single event in immigration history, the urgency of formulating a modern immigration policy. A study of the whole Cuban immigration process may lead to an immigration policy that recognizes the absolute necessity of limiting growth while acknowledging the proud tradition of the United States as a nation built by immigrants. No other state promises to be better served by an intelligent and consistent immigration policy than Florida.

How many states or communities can afford to increase their population by 125,000 within a few short months and still maintain the vitality and stability necessary for continued development of opportunity in American society?

Recent changes in the legal status of Mariel refugees making them eligible for citizenship will allow residency status to as many as 300,000 new Cuban arrivals--spouses and unmarried children--in the United States within the next few years, even disregarding any additional influxes of immigrants from south of Florida's borders.

The recounting and attempt to demythologize the recent Cuban immigration to Florida and the United States may lay a foundation of knowledge on which to build a sensitive but forceful immigration policy. Florida must be one of the bellwether states in forcing the "unpleasant choices" of which Leon Bouvier speaks:

> Determining the "best" immigration policy change can hardly be accomplished without an overall population policy which includes at least an optimum goal both as to population numbers and growth rates....The U.S. still does not have a population policy which might guide overall planning in the future.

Recognizing that the United States will never completely close its doors, what then can be learned from the Cuban immigration experiences that will allow us to do the following?

1. Assist communities that are impacted by immigration.

2. Address questions of initial entrance, resettlement and responsibilities that must be shared and coordinated among local, state and national governments in successfully planning, monitoring and providing appropriate transitions for immigrants as they progress from aliens to citizens.

Chapter 2.—Hispanics in Florida and the United States

Immigration to the United States increasingly magnifies the significance of Hispanics within our society. Hispanics are second only to blacks as a racial/ethnic minority population and are increasing at a faster rate than blacks due both to immigration and to natural increase. By the year 2000, Hispanics are projected to be the largest minority population. (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982.)

Florida has provided a most significant role for the entire Hispanic population. In 1980, Florida had the fourth largest Hispanic population although it was only the seventh largest state. While Cuban Hispanics are associated with Florida in the minds of most, Florida also ranks fourth in Puerto Rican population and ninth in Mexican population. By the year 2000, Florida is expected to be the fourth largest state, and undoubtedly will hold its share of the Hispanic population, if indeed it does not surpass its present status due to the recent and impending changes in immigrant/residency policy mentioned above. Without a doubt, the Hispanic population will have continuing impact upon Florida's future growth and development.

Cubans are generally viewed as being unique due to their concentration in Florida and particularly South Florida. However, 1980 statistics show that each major Hispanic population is concentrated into one or two states, and into selected urban areas within these states. At least 40 percent of each of the major Hispanic groups is accounted for within one state: 59 percent of Cubans in Florida, 49 percent of Puerto Ricans in New York and 42 percent of Mexicans in California. Approximately three-fourths of all Hispanics reside in five states (Table 1).

Each of the top-ranking states for any <u>one</u> major Hispanic group also ranks in the top ten for the other Hispanic groups. As pointed out earlier, Florida ranks number one for Cubans, number four for Puerto Ricans and number nine for Mexicans (see Tables 2-4). In some respects, the Mexicans are uniquely distributed in not being represented at all in the Northeast as are both the Cubans and Puerto Ricans. Mexicans are limited to the agricultural states of the Southwest and to some extent the Midwest. However, the Cubans still are the most concentrated Hispanic group, being represented in large numbers in fewer states and being more heavily concentrated in Florida than either the Mexicans or Puerto Ricans are in California and New York, respectively.

Not only are Hispanics concentrated in certain states but they are distributed mainly among a few specific urban centers when considered either by absolute size or by proportion relative to the rest of the population. The metropolitan areas of Miami, Los Angeles, New York, San Antonio and Chicago each have more than half a million Hispanics and another five metropolitan areas have between one-quarter and one-half million Hispanics. Indeed, more than 88 percent of all Hispanics are concentrated into metropolitan statistical areas, compared to 82 percent of blacks and 74 percent of whites. Even

Table 1.—Spanish-Origin Persons in Selected States by Rank, 1980 and 1970

	1980			1970		
	Rank	Number	Percent	Rank	Number	Percent
United States	---	14,608,673	100.0	---	9,072,602	100.0
States with 100,000 or more Spanish-origin persons in 1980	---	13,254,580	90.7	---	8,026,186	88.5
California	1	4,544,331	31.1	1	2,369,292	26.1
Texas	2	2,985,824	20.4	2	1,840,648	20.3
New York	3	1,659,300	11.4	3	1,351,982	14.9
Florida	4	858,158	5.9	4	405,036	4.5
Illinois	5	635,602	4.4	5	393,204	4.3
New Jersey	6	491,883	3.4	7	288,488	3.2
New Mexico	7	477,222	3.3	6	308,340	3.4
Arizona	8	440,701	3.0	8	264,770	2.9
Colorado	9	339,717	2.3	9	225,506	2.5
Michigan	10	162,440	1.1	10	151,070	1.7
Pennsylvania	11	153,961	1.1	13	108,893	1.2
Massachusetts	12	141,043	1.0	15	66,146	0.7
Connecticut	13	124,499	0.9	16	65,458	0.7
Washington	14	120,016	0.8	19	57,358	0.6
Ohio	15	119,883	0.8	11	129,995	1.4

Table 2.—Mexican-Origin Persons in Selected States by Rank, 1980 and 1970

	1980			1970		
	Rank	Number	Percent	Rank	Number	Percent
United States	---	8,740,439	100.0	---	4,532,435	100.0
States with 50,000 or more Mexican-origin persons in 1980	---	8,019,294	91.7	---	4,275,704	94.3
California	1	3,637,466	41.6	1	1,857,267	41.0
Texas	2	2,752,487	31.5	2	1,619,064	35.7
Illinois	3	408,325	4.7	4	160,419	3.5
Arizona	4	396,410	4.5	3	239,811	5.3
New Mexico	5	233,772	2.7	5	119,049	2.6
Colorado	6	207,204	2.4	6	103,584	2.3
Michigan	7	112,183	1.3	7	65,329	1.4
Washington	8	81,112	0.9	8	33,483	0.7
Florida	9	79,392	0.9	13	20,869	0.5
Indiana	10	57,625	0.7	9	30,034	0.7
Ohio	11	53,318	0.6	11	26,795	0.6

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population: Supplementary Report, Persons of Spanish Origin by State. PC80-S1-7.

Table 3.—Puerto Rican-Origin Persons in Selected States by Rank, 1980 and 1970

	1980			1970		
	Rank	Number	Percent	Rank	Number	Percent
United States	---	2,013,945	100.0	---	1,429,396	100.0
States with 10,000 or more Puerto Rican-origin persons in 1980	---	1,924,069	95.5	---	1,389,980	97.2
New York	1	986,389	49.0	1	916,608	64.1
New Jersey	2	243,540	12.1	2	138,896	9.7
Illinois	3	129,165	6.4	3	87,477	6.1
Florida	4	94,775	4.7	7	28,166	2.0
California	5	93,038	4.6	4	50,929	3.6
Pennsylvania	6	91,802	4.6	5	44,263	3.1
Connecticut	7	88,361	4.4	6	37,603	2.6
Massachusetts	8	76,450	3.8	8	23,332	1.6
Ohio	9	32,442	1.6	9	20,272	1.4
Texas	10	22,938	1.1	13	6,333	0.4
Hawaii	11	19,351	1.0	10	9,284	0.6
Indiana	12	12,683	0.6	11	9,269	0.6
Michigan	13	12,425	0.6	15	6,202	0.4
Wisconsin	14	10,483	0.5	12	7,248	0.5
Virginia	15	10,227	0.5	16	4,098	0.3

Table 4.—Cuban-Origin Persons in Selected States by Rank, 1980 and 1970

	1980			1970		
	Rank	Number	Percent	Rank	Number	Percent
United States	---	803,226	100.0	---	544,600	100.0
States with 10,000 or more Cuban-origin persons in 1980	---	722,243	89.9	---	483,369	88.8
Florida	1	470,250	58.5	1	250,406	46.0
New Jersey	2	80,860	10.1	3	68,048	12.5
New York	3	76,942	9.6	2	89,596	16.5
California	4	61,004	7.6	4	47,560	8.7
Illinois	5	19,063	2.4	5	20,796	3.8
Texas	6	14,124	1.8	6	6,963	1.3

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population: Supplementary Report, Persons of Spanish Origin by State. PC80-S1-7.

greater Cuban concentrations are found in the larger central cities of the metropolitan areas. Of fourteen central cities having Hispanic populations larger than 100,000 in 1980, Hialeah and Miami in Florida have respectively the first and third highest proportions (see Table 5).

Although these figures would differ somewhat if they were updated to reflect both the legal and illegal immigrants since April 1, 1980, the highly concentrated nature of the Hispanic population within the United States would not change. Therefore, Florida is not unique with respect to its concentration of Cuban immigrants and several other large states share its concern with the immigration of Hispanics.

Table 5.—Metropolitan Statistical Area Central Cities With at Least 100,000 Spanish-Origin Population, 1980

Rank	MSA central city	Population of Spanish origin, 1980	
		Number	Percent
1	New York, NY	1,406,024	19.9
2	Los Angeles, CA	816,076	27.5
3	Chicago, IL	422,063	14.0
4	San Antonio, TX	421,954	53.7
5	Houston, TX	281,331	17.6
6	El Paso, TX	265,819	62.5
7	Miami, FL	194,037	55.9
8	San Jose, CA	140,529	22.3
9	San Diego, CA	130,613	14.9
10	Phoenix, AZ	116,736	14.8
11	Albuquerque, NM	112,084	33.8
12	Dallas, TX	111,083	12.3
13	Corpus Christi, TX	108,175	46.6
14	Hialeah, FL*	107,908	74.3

*New central city.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population: Supplementary Report, Persons of Spanish Origin by Metropolitan Statistical Areas. PC80-S1-18.

Chapter 3.—Cubans in the United States

The current Cuban population ranks as the third largest Hispanic-origin population in the United States, totaling 803,226 in 1980. This is an increase of about 260,000 or 48 percent over the 1970 figure.

Although Cubans account for only 6 percent of the Hispanic-origin population in the country, they form sizeable proportions of the Hispanic populations in several states. Regionally, their distribution has traditionally concentrated in the Middle and South Atlantic areas.

Cubans account for more than half--55 percent--of all Hispanics in Florida, 16 percent in New Jersey, 10 percent in Georgia, 8 percent in both Maryland and Louisiana and 7 percent in Nevada.

Large Cuban communities can also be found in five other states: New Jersey, New York, California, Illinois and Texas (refer to Table 4). New Jersey, which replaced New York as the state with the second largest Cuban-origin population, contains 10 percent of the nation's Cuban population.

Among the urban areas other than Miami and Hialeah where Cubans have already settled are West New York/Union City-New Jersey, Chicago, Tampa and Key West. These cities could also become important resettlement areas for future Cuban arrivals.

Present estimates of the Cuban population

It must be noted that the actual number of Hispanics, and therefore of the constituent subgroups such as Cubans and Mexicans, is difficult to know because of Census undercount, the number of illegal aliens and the large influx of immigrants following the April 1980 Census (McCoy and Gonzalez 1982, 26).

The latest estimates of Cubans residing in the United States are provided in Table 6 by Guarione Diaz, executive director of the Cuban National Planning Council in Miami. While the combined population of Cubans within selected cities was recorded by the 1980 Census at less than 700,000, the 1985 estimate of the Cuban National Planning Council puts the number of Cubans in the United States at more than 1,000,000. This estimate includes the resettlement of the Mariel population in the respective cities shown.

Miami-Dade is estimated to have almost 200,000 more Cubans than published in the 1980 Census. Other favored destinations with historical foundations for Cubans, such as Union City, New York, and Washington D.C., also show populations greater than the 1980 figures. San Juan, Puerto Rico, although not generally included in the U.S. totals, is included in the estimates because of its importance for Cubans now and in the future.

Table 6.—Cuban-Americans by Metropolitan Area of Residence, Census 1980 and Estimates 1985

Metropolitan area	Census 1980	Estimates 1985[1]
Miami-Dade*	405,810	600,000
Union City/West New York	73,400	90,000
New York City	63,189	70,000
Los Angeles-Long Beach	46,363	50,000
San Juan, Puerto Rico[2]	19,767	21,000
Tampa-St. Petersburg*	21,181	26,000
Chicago	18,468	24,000
Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood*	11,351	20,000
Orlando*	5,001	15,000
Washington, D.C.	7,317	15,000
Boston	5,267	13,000
West Palm Beach*	10,600	11,000
Atlanta	3,975	7,000
Dallas-Ft. Worth	3,252	8,000
Florida Keys*	4,148	5,000
New Orleans	5,706	2,000
Other areas in United States	118,198	100,000
Total	822,993	1,077,000

*Florida areas.

[1]Estimates from Guarione Diaz, executive director of the Cuban National Planning Council in Miami, Florida, personal communication, May 1985.

[2]San Juan, Puerto Rico is not included in the total U.S. Census population of Cubans (the figure of 803,226 in Tables 4 and 7).

History of Cuban immigration in the United States

The historical beginnings of Cuban immigration were in the mid-nineteenth century (see Table 7). For more than one hundred years after 1850, no great numbers of Cubans came to the U.S., but the small streams of emigres did establish precedence and cultural bases for later Cuban arrivals.

The political instability and consequent leadership changes that took place in Cuba up to the 1959 revolution prompted a series of migration waves of exiles who expected to return to their country at some later, and politically more secure, time. Long before 1959, exiles moved back and forth between Havana and Miami in reaction to changes in government which followed Cuba's independence from Spain in 1898.

Prior to the 1959 revolution, the flow of immigrants from Cuba to the U.S. amounted to little more than a trickle (Wayne C. Miller 1976). As early as 1850, some 5,000 Cuban-born immigrants had arrived in this country (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960). Many settled first in the New York-New Jersey

area in the 1880s to work in the cigar industry, but they soon abandoned the Northeast for South Florida's climate and proximity to Cuba (Ralph Boggs, 1973), establishing significant communities in Key West and Tampa where they managed a prosperous cigar industry. By the time Cuba gained independence from Spain in 1898, many Cubans had resettled in various Florida areas where they invested in land and the tobacco industry.

After President Batista's first term in office (1940-1944), wealthy exiles began arriving in Miami. They invested in Florida real estate and their financial accomplishments were publicized in the local news media. The image of Cubans as a successful ethnic group both in business and in adjustment to life in the United states thus began during the late 1940s.

Table 7.—Total Number of Cubans Residing in the U.S., 1850-1985

Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number
1850	5,772	1900	11,081	1950	29,295
1860	7,353	1910	15,133	1960	79,150
1870	5,319	1920	14,872	1970	544,600
1880	6,917	1930	18,493	1980	803,226
1890	9,970	1940	15,277	1985	1,077,000

Note: Total for the year 1890 was extrapolated from the combined figures for Cuba and the West Indies. Estimate for 1985 is by Guarione Diaz, Cuban National Planning Council.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, 1975; and 1980 Census of Population: Supplementary Report, Persons of Spanish Origin by State. PC80-S1-7.

The first six decades of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual growth in the number of Cuban immigrants arriving in this country. However Castro's revolutionary takeover in 1959 precipitated a series of distinctive stages of immigration. Although this discussion divides this movement somewhat arbitrarily into six recognizable stages, the selected periods do coincide with certain historical and political events that affected the immigration policies of Cuba, the United States and some other key countries.

Chapter 4.—Stages of the Modern Cuban Immigration

Although sociodemographic differences existed among Cubans arriving at different stages of the post-revolutionary immigration, it is not advisable to link changes in demographic characteristics of refugee waves to a chronology of events in Cuba. Demographers Richard Fagen and Richard Brody warn that: "The emigration process and the occupational flow are too complex to allow us to make a cohesive set of relational statements of the form, 'when event X happened in Cuba, persons of type Y left'" (1964, 397).

The 1985 Cuban population in the United States has been estimated to be more than one million. Table 8 illustrates the six stages of post-1959 Cuban immigration to the United States, focusing on historical and political events surrounding each period, showing the manner of transportation used by refugees and documenting estimates of Cuban arrivals per immigration stage. Two alternate estimates are shown for each of the six stages. Because estimates vary according to the methods used in gathering immigration data, it is not possible to establish precise numbers or extensive characteristics of Cubans who arrived after 1959.

Table 8.—Estimates of Cuban Arrivals, 1959-1980

Immigration stages	Manner of transportation	Estimate A	Estimate B
First Stage Early departures, Castro's takeover January 1, 1959-October 22, 1962	Commercial flights from Havana	248,070[1]	153,534[2]
Second Stage Post-missile crisis October 22, 1962- September 28, 1965	No direct transportation Small boats and rafts	55,916[1]	29,962[2]
Third Stage Freedom flights, family reunification September 28, 1965-April 6, 1973	U.S. airlift	297,318[1]	268,040[2]
Fourth Stage Third-country arrivals April 6, 1973-October 21, 1978	Commercial flights from Spain, Mexico, Jamaica	38,903[1] (January 1972/ December 1974)	17,899[2]
Fifth Stage Ex-political prisoners/families and others October 21, 1978-April 22, 1980	Flights from Cuba Small boats and rafts	10,000[5]	21,839[2]
Sixth Stage Mariel boatlift April 22, 1980-September 27, 1980	Boatlift to Key West from Mariel Harbor	124,789[3]	125,118[6]

[1]Juan Clark, 1975. [2]Cuban Refugee Program registration. [3]Cuban-Haitian Task Force. [5]Guillermo Martinez, The Miami Herald, 1981. [6]Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Lisandro Perez, 1981.

Demographic analyses of each immigration wave show diversity in socioeconomic status and other social indicators among the different refugee groups. Most studies of the Cuban immigration process conclude that the variance is partly due to travel regulations imposed by Cuba and/or the United States.

As the emigration waves from Cuba progressed, the demographic composition of the refugee population began to reflect a distribution more representative of pre-revolutionary Cuban society. The families who left Cuba soon after Castro's takeover were over-representative of the professional occupations and many belonged to the elite power structure of former President Batista's government.

On the other hand, the refugees who left via the 1980 Mariel boatlift twenty-one years later were mostly young, working-class males (Bach 1980a). Arriving during the middle stages were refugees whose main similarity was that they had relatives living in the United States. Many of them had waited years to obtain travel visas; others fled illegally in small boats and rafts.

The occupations of the great majority of Cuban refugees, at all times, have matched the types of jobs available in areas of eventual Cuban settlement in the United States. Unlike other groups of refugees in the United States, Cubans have not lacked urban industrial skills (Bach 1980b, 41). Because of their skills, Cubans have been, for the most part, integrated into the service, clerical and professional occupations in most areas of the United States.

In the next pages we shall examine each of the six modern waves of Cuban immigration with respect to similarities and differences in the method of travel and the number, occupation, education and age of the migrants. The six waves of Cuban immigration and their corresponding dates are outlined below:

First Stage: Early Departures	January 1, 1959-October 22, 1962
Second Stage: Post-Missile Crisis	October 22, 1962-September 28, 1965
Third Stage: Freedom Flights and Family Reunification	September 28, 1965-April 6, 1973
Fourth Stage: Third-Country Arrivals	April 6, 1973-October 21, 1978
Fifth Stage: Release of Political Prisoners and their Families	October 21, 1978-April 22, 1980
Sixth Stage: The Mariel Boatlift	April 22, 1980-September 27, 1980

First Stage: Early Departures
January 1, 1959-October 22, 1962

The first wave of immigration began at the outset of Castro's takeover on New Year's Day, 1959, and continued until the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Travel was not restricted until the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the U.S. in 1961. Sociologist Juan Clark (1975) estimates that 248,070 Cubans arrived during the first stage of immigration.

Before the diplomatic break in 1961, Cubans wishing to emigrate secured visas at the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Havana. Special provisions were made for exiles who applied for political asylum in the various Latin American embassies in Havana and for relatives of the Bay of Pigs (April 1961) prisoners. The Catholic Welfare Bureau brought 14,127 unaccompanied children, ages 6 to 16, to the U.S. without travel restrictions.

Comparisons between First Stage refugees and the native Cuban population as reported in the 1953 Cuban census reveal some differences in the prevalence of certain occupational categories. Overall, the refugee population until 1962 shows an over-representation of professional and semiprofessional persons and an under-representation of persons in extractive occupations like agriculture and fishing. These differences are mirrored in the relatively high educational attainment of the refugee work-force and in its age distribution reflecting ages peaking between 36 and 40 years (Fagen and Brody 1964, 393).

Second Stage: Post-Missile Crisis
October 22, 1962-September 28, 1965

The Second Stage of immigration to the United States brought fewer refugees than the First Stage. Clark (1975) estimates that 55,916 refugees arrived during this three-year period, including 6,698 who came illegally. Following the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States in 1961, Cubans could no longer use commercial transportation directly from Havana. They applied for and obtained U.S. visas in third countries (such as Mexico, Spain, Jamaica, Colombia and Venezuela) where they had to reside before coming to the U.S. Both in order to accelerate this lengthy process and decrease the costs associated with it, the U.S. government began a new entry procedure. The "visa waiver" was available from the U.S. Department of State to Cubans living in the U.S. to favor their relatives in Cuba. More than 700,000 visa waivers were processed by the State Department and the Immigration Office in Miami until they were discontinued soon after the missile crisis in October 1962.

Coupled with increasing travel restrictions subsequent to the missile crisis, Cubans witnessed a tightening in internal social controls and the start of a government-imposed system of rationing of food, clothing and basic necessities as well as further confiscations of land and property. Disappointment with the political and economic course of the revolution also contributed to the illegal exodus of segments of the working class. Additional deterrent policies such as forced surrender of bank accounts and private homes further restricted departures.

During this stage, 1,117 released prisoners from the Bay of Pigs expedition and their families, a total of 4,903 persons, were allowed legal exit from Cuba in exchange for shipments of much-needed medicines and medical supplies from the U.S.

As with the total refugee population, it is possible to describe only in general terms the sociodemographic characteristics of Second Stage refugees. When compared to the 1953 Cuban census, the refugees arriving between 1962 and 1963 again over-represented professional and semiprofessional occupations while the extractive occupations (fishing and agriculture) remained underrepresented. Likewise, the educational levels of the early migrants reflected their relatively high socioeconomic standing.

After 1963, however, the occupational composition of the refugee population became more representative of Cuban society. Later arrivals included higher proportions of young adult males and larger percentages of skilled, semiskilled and extractive workers. In 1964, the percentage of professionals among newly arrived refugees reached its lowest point. The proportion of farmers and fishermen increased significantly but the percentage of service workers remained stable, a pattern that would continue through 1974.

An important group of refugees who arrived during this stage consisted of 6,698 escapees who fled Cuba on small boats, rafts and precarious homemade seafaring contraptions. The increasing numbers of skilled and extractive workers among the escapees who registered at the Cuban Refugee Center during this period is indicative of a change in the socioeconomic makeup of the Cuban immigration flow. In comparing the escapee population to the national Cuban population of 1953, Clark (1975) discovered that except for the occupational categories of skilled, semiskilled and extractive, the escapees were closer to the parent population in occupational composition than the other exiles.

Third Stage: Freedom Flights and Family Reunification September 28, 1965-April 6, 1973

New internal pressures began to build in Cuba, culminating in another exodus of dissidents beginning in 1965. In his annual speech to the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution on September 28, 1965, Castro publicly announced that all Cubans who wished to flee the country were free to do so. This announcement was immediately followed by a tremendous charge of vessels into the ninety miles of water separating Cuba and South Florida.

The chaos was not unlike that during the Mariel boatlift. President Johnson, however, reacted somewhat differently and more quickly than President Carter to handle the ensuing disorganization. On October 3, 1965, speaking from the base of the Statue of Liberty, he welcomed the people of Cuba, reminding all of America's dedication to the tradition of asylum for oppressed peoples everywhere. He had arranged the exit of would-be Cuban exiles through an orderly entry into the United States via a Havana-Miami airlift which had been set up by the Embassy of Switzerland in Cuba. The airlift continued from 1965 until April 16, 1973, during which time well over a quarter of a million persons left Cuba to join earlier arrivals in the United States (McCoy, Page and Gonzalez 1980).

The Miami-based Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) reported 268,040 registrants and Clark (1975) calculated 297,318 arrivals by the end of the eight-year period, including 4,993 Cubans who arrived by boat just prior to the negotiated airlift. The first airlift arrivals were those officially claimed by their closest U.S. relatives through the Family Reunification Program.

Travel regulations imposed by the Cuban government upon Cuban nationals clearly barred the exit of males between 15 and 26 years of age as well as technicians or skilled personnel. Despite these regulations, and reflecting the U.S. government-imposed priority for relatives of Cubans living in the U.S., professionals were heavily represented among early airlift arrivals. Thus, the predominance of professionals which characterized the First and early Second Stages could again be seen at the beginning of the Third Stage. As the Third Stage progressed however, there was an increase in the number of arrivals possessing lower occupational skills, and they dominated the latter years of this stage.

In summary, early Freedom Flights refugees' educational and occupational composition mirrored the First Stage of the Cuban exodus. After 1965, however, the professional category among new exiles declined and leveled off. By the end of the Freedom Flights in 1973, skilled, clerical and sales occupations surpassed other occupational categories among refugee arrivals. Fishers and farm personnel were more in evidence, peaking in 1971 at almost a fourth of the refugee labor force, while the proportion of service occupations remained unchanged from past immigration waves.

Educational attainment among Third Stage refugees closely resembled that of the Second Stage Post-Missile Crisis refugees. Ninety percent had eleven years or less of education, and those with four to six years of education reached an alltime peak in 1967. The proportion of illiterates also peaked among Third Stage exiles, corresponding no doubt to the increase in workers from the extractive employment categories. Third Stage emigrees, whose average age was 47.5, were older than previous groups.

Fourth Stage: Third Country Arrivals
April 6, 1973-October 21, 1978

When Castro suddenly announced the end of the airlift in 1973, a new stage of Cuban immigration began. Immigrants in this stage differed from earlier groups both in their social backgrounds and in their orientations toward the receiving society. The new arrivals belonged to the Cuban working class, and their departure was motivated by prospects of improved economic attainment in the U.S. (Portes, Clark and Bach 1977).

The Fourth Stage of Cuban immigration technically began in 1971, following the first interruption of commercial Cuba-U.S. flights. Of course, the official termination of the airlift did not in any way impede the flow of refugees from Cuba, and exiles still reached the U.S. by way of Spain and Mexico. The pattern of transportation was similar to that used by Cubans during the Second Stage of immigration (1962-1965) when no direct route existed between the island and the U.S. An increase in the number of refugees illegally fleeing Cuba on boats and rafts was seen again during the Fourth Stage.

There is no consensus on the number of Cuban arrivals during this stage. Available estimates differ greatly (see Table 8), but it is clear that the significant decrease in the number of Cubans emigrating to the U.S. during this five-year period was a result of Cuban-imposed travel regulations: the nullification of exit applications and rigid curtailment of illegal departures (Clark 1975).

Studies of the Cuban exodus have established that exiles' decisions for leaving during the early years of the revolution were largely political. Later refugees, however, increasingly responded to economic aspirations as important factors.

The Fourth Stage exile cohort was less educated than preceding ones; 92 percent had less than twelve years of education and only 10 percent were professionals or managers in Cuba. While the earlier groups seemingly over-represented the middle-class segment of Cuban society, the majority of post-airlift arrivals belonged to the working class.

Craftworkers or nontransport machine operatives, including supervisors, artisans, plumbers, electricians, carpenters, butchers and bakers, predominated among Fourth Stage arrivals. Service workers and professionals, including technical and clerical workers, comprised a smaller segment. Interestingly, as Bach (1980a, 1980b) and Portes and Bach (1980) have shown, these occupational breakdowns correspond rather closely with the later pattern of the 1980 Mariel arrivals, especially in their common concentration in craft and operative jobs.

Analyses of 1959-1979 Cuban migration show that the overwhelming proportion of refugees were white. In fact, until 1974 there was no evidence of a trend toward increased proportions of blacks and mulattos among the arrivals.

Throughout the twenty-three-year migration, including the Mariel exodus, most exiles and refugees had lived in and emigrated from urban centers like the greater Havana area. This is not surprising, since: (a) the pre-1959 internal migratory trend shifted toward the capital city and (b) the city of Havana had served as a staging area for post-revolutionary emigration (Portes, Clark and Bach 1977).

Fifth Stage: Release of Political Prisoners and their Families October 21, 1978-April 22, 1980

An unprecedented event in the history of revolutionary Cuba took place in Havana on October 10, 1978, when Fidel Castro announced the forthcoming departure from Cuba of 3,600 political prisoners and their families. The prisoners chosen for release represented about 10 percent of the total number of political prisoners held in Cuban jails and included some who had already completed their prison terms. The Cuban government further proclaimed its sudden commitment to family reunification by allowing 100,000 Cuban exiles to visit relatives in Cuba in 1979.

It is estimated that 10,000 to 14,000 persons arrived in the U.S. during the seventeen-month Havana-Miami airlift in this stage. The State Department granted 3,600 humanitarian paroles to incoming political prisoners and their

families. Then suddenly, and with no official warning from Havana, the airlift ended in March, 1980, shortly before the onset of the Freedom Flotilla. Nevertheless, the groundwork had been laid for the acceptance of additional Cuban political prisoners.

According to the Refugee Act of 1980, provisions were made for the legal entry of 16,000 Cubans during the year. Priority would be given to political prisoners and their families as well as to persons with relatives in the U.S. An estimated 9,000 Cubans entered the U.S. under the act. The remaining "authorized" 7,000 presumably arrived via the Boatlift, along with 117,000 "unauthorized" refugees (Martinez 1981).

No analyses of the demographic characteristics of the Cubans who arrived during this stage of immigration have been made. The only records that exist pertain to the 3,600 paroles granted by the State Department, and social scientists have yet to analyze them. Based on previous settlement patterns of Cuban immigrants, it is safe to assume that most Fifth Stage entrants remained in Dade County, Florida.

Sixth Stage: The Mariel Boatlift
April 22, 1980-September 27, 1980

When the news reached Miami in the spring of 1980 that 10,000 Cubans had sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, the exile community quickly organized a collection of food, money, medicines and clothing for them. Immediately, exiled Cuban leaders began to pressure for negotiations between the United States and Cuban governments for release of the dissidents. There were also calls for military action by anti-Castro groups.

Then on April 20 the Castro regime announced that all Cubans wishing to emigrate to the United States were free to board boats at the port of Mariel. The Cuban exiles then quickly formed flotillas of small craft and brought 125,000 of their former countrymen to Key West in a five-month period.

According to State Department reports, the exodus was rooted in several years of deepening economic and political frustration in Cuba. Severe problems in production of sugar and tobacco, Cuba's two major crops, contributed to the difficulties of providing adequate economic and educational opportunities for a young and rapidly growing labor force. The result was a rising tide of restlessness and disaffection among those Cubans with relatives in the U.S. This was further aggravated by the return of 100,000 Cuban exiles who had been allowed to visit relatives in Cuba the previous year (Department of State July 1980, 80-81).

On May 14, President Carter called upon the Cuban-American community to end the boat flotilla and help bring about a safe and orderly resolution to this crisis; he instructed the U.S. Coast Guard to stop the boatlift, and boat captains waiting at Mariel were ordered to return to Key West immediately.

From the start, it was evident that the Cuban authorities were following a deliberate policy of forcing acceptance of several nonrelatives as well as relatives on each boat. Some nonrelatives included persons who had been released from sanitariums and penal institutions as well as individuals claiming to have taken refuge in the Peruvian Embassy.

Who came from Mariel?

Several studies have been based on samples of Mariel refugees, but the highly controversial nature of the original data-collection process has hindered the development by social scientists of a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the Mariel population.

The chaotic development and eventual conclusion of this exodus has influenced the procurement of sociodemographic data in two ways. First, the procedures at different processing points in Key West and Miami-Dade prevented the centralization of data gathering. Second, until the opening of resettlement camps, 62,000 Cubans or approximately one-half of the total number of Mariel refugees were released directly to their relatives living in Miami. The other half were sent directly to resettlement camps, partly to relieve the strain upon the local processing center but also to separate those refugees without relatives in the United States so sponsors and homes could be found for them. Available data sources indicate that these two groups of refugees, the camp population and the Miami-Dade population, were demographically different. The camp population was composed predominantly of young, single, working-class males, while the Miami-Dade group had a higher concentration of women and family groups.

These data suggest that the compositions of the two populations of Mariel refugees were affected by the screening criteria utilized by Cuban immigration officials. The takeover of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana and the subsequent exodus from the port of Mariel were related but different incidents. An examination of the differences between these events helps to clarify the differences in demographic characteristics of the refugees.

According to eyewitness accounts and to the testimony of later refugee arrivals, there was no apparent selection process in the flow of 10,800 Cubans who invaded the Peruvian Embassy. There is, however, evidence that the Cuban government later implemented a screening process based on criteria that relied on identifying social or political "undesirables."

More important, the Mariel Exodus completed a cycle that began during the Second Stage of immigration (1962-1965). As each succeeding wave of immigrants became more representative of the original Cuban population, the refugee population that arrived after the Embassy takeover was, in turn, over-representative of the Cuban working class.

The combination of numbers of social and political undesirables, even larger numbers of refugees arriving without families to welcome them, and the necessity of housing thousands of people in semimilitary camps for long periods of time produced strains on both the arriving population and the host community which led to hostility and unrest widely covered in the news media.

Ironically, in spite of all the extensive news coverage of the "undesirables"--the alleged criminals, drug users, homosexuals--there continues to be a lack of reliable data on the characteristics and traits of the immigrants. The press, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and other federal, state and local officials have not provided accurate information about the approximately 125,000 Cuban refugees, and in our attempts to locate factual information concerning the refugees we have been frustrated. Agencies, and in some cases researchers, have been reluctant to provide documentation or to produce any data about the characteristics of the total Mariel Flotilla population. Consequently, most of the available reports have relied upon biased samples of persons located in the camps. Our research indicates that the populations of the camps have been the most observed yet least representative groups of the total immigration population (Gonzalez and McCoy 1980).

One of the few surveys which attempts to present a representative profile of the total Mariel group was conducted in 1980 by Dr. Robert L. Bach of the Brookings Institution. His findings are based on a number of selected samples of refugees arriving at different times and places during the Mariel exodus. Samples include: (1) a 50 percent systematic random sample of Cuban Refugee Program registration forms (representing a total of 1,937 arrivals); (2) a 10 percent sample of Immigration and Naturalization Service biographical forms from the Opa Locka processing center in Miami (sample size 633); and (3) a 10 percent sample of the Immigration Service's biographical forms for the entrants processed at each resettlement camp (sample size 5,695). Bach analyzed a total of 8,265 records, and these are by far the best representative samples of the total Mariel population available to social science researchers. Bach (1980a) concludes that:

> ...contrary to what some have charged, the "Flotilla" emigrants were not marginal to the Cuban economy, but indeed central to it. They can also certainly be regarded as employable in the U.S. In fact, the Mariel group resembles rather closely many pre-Mariel refugees who arrived in the later stages of the "aerial bridge" (1965-1973 Freedom Flights) and afterwards and who have since become active contributors to the American work force.

Following is a description of the sociodemographic characteristics of Mariel refugees based on data available to researchers and the media but which in no way comprehensively describe the 124,789 Mariel arrivals. Data sources include: (a) Cuban-Haitian Task Force reports, (b) published and unpublished scholarly articles and (c) media accounts.

Chapter 5.—Portrait of the Mariel Refugees

The Miami profile

By October 31, 1980, about one-half (49.9 percent) of all 124,789 entrants were registered at processing centers in South Florida cities: Miami, Opa Locka and Key West. The majority of these 62,000 arrivals disembarked at Key West in late April and throughout May.

Compared to the resettlement camp population, which arrived between June and September, the Miami group had a larger proportion of women (50 percent) and married persons (50 percent) who had direct family ties in the U.S. (89 percent) (Bach 1981). Ninety percent of the Miami sample were white, compared to only 50 percent estimated for the camp samples. However, for the first time in Cuban migratory history, the racial composition of Mariel entrants approximated more closely the racial composition of the Cuban island population.

The racial composition of the exodus is probably the most difficult characteristic to ascertain because no racial data were collected during the pre-Mariel migrations. Furthermore, the self-reported nature of racial data during the Mariel exodus poses serious questions about its accuracy, since Cuban racial interpretations often tended not to coincide with U.S. immigration officials' own definitions based on the observed physical characteristics of the refugees.

According to 1960 and 1970 U.S. Census information, the nonwhite Cuban population in the U.S. was 6.5 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively. The proportions are vastly under-representative of nonwhites as reported in the 1953 Cuban Census, which claimed that blacks and Asians accounted for 27.2 percent of the population. The larger perceived proportion of blacks or mulattos in the Flotilla population adds a significant new dimension to the Cuban-American community which had remained 95 percent white until Mariel.

According to Bach's samples, the occupational backgrounds of the Cuban entrants do not reflect the Cuban government's harsh statements concerning the would-be refugees. The Cuban refugees processed in South Florida held craft, operative and laborer jobs in Cuba. Most prevalent were mechanics, heavy-equipment and factory-machine operatives, carpenters, masons and bus, taxi and truck drivers. The proportion of women was close to their true share in the population, and the percentage of both service workers and homemakers was from 12 to 14 percent. Twenty percent of the professionals were teachers and there were also physicians, nurses, professors, accountants and computer operators in the Miami sample. (See Table 9.)

Table 9.—Last Occupation in Cuba for Refugees Age 14 and Over Processed in Florida, 1980

Occupation	Coral Gables Emergency Center		Opa Locka Airport		Eglin Air Force Base	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total employed	641	100.0	43	100.0	732[1]	100.0
Professional and technical	67	10.5	3	7.0	52	7.1
Manager and administrator	11	1.7	1	2.3	11	1.5
Sales	9	1.4	1	2.3	7	1.0
Clerical	45	7.0	4	9.3	45	6.1
Craft	197	30.7	6	14.0	166	22.7
Operative	73	11.4	4	9.3	103	14.1
Transport operative	86	13.4	12	27.8	82	11.2
Laborer	108	16.9	3	7.0	183	25.0
Farm laborer	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	1.1
Farmer	2	0.3	3	7.0	0	0.0
Service	43	6.7	6	14.0	74	10.1
Private household	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1

[1]Data unrecorded for 18 persons.

Source: Robert L Bach, The New Cuban Immigrants: their background and prospects, Monthly Labor Review 103, 10:39-46.

The educational background of early Mariel arrivals is similar to that of Fourth Stage refugees (1973-1978). The latter had completed an average of 9.0 years of schooling, while Mariel refugees similarly had an average of 8.9 years of schooling.

Given their educational and occupational status, the Miami entrants could hardly be called "dregs," "scum," "undesirables." Only one person sampled by Bach among the earliest arrivals was unemployed prior to arrival and only 18 percent of his Miami sample were out of the labor force (these persons were registered as homemakers, retired persons and military personnel). Overall, the Cuban entrants who were processed and released directly into Miami were quite like previous Cuban exiles.

The resettlement camp profile

More than 62,000 entrants were processed outside of South Florida. Federal officials decided early in the processing operations at Key West to send family groups to Miami-Dade County and single men and women to resettlement camps at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; Ft. McCoy, Wisconsin; Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas; and Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. These camps were responsible for more than 45 percent of all resettlements (see Table 10). By August 1980 the populations at each camp had decreased substantially and the remaining 5,835 Cubans were consolidated at Ft. Chaffee. By March 1981 only 3,700 Cubans remained in Ft. Chaffee and the camp closed in February 1982.

Table 10.—Population Size and Percent Male and Female for each Resettlement Camp, Cuban Entrants of All Ages, 1980

Camp	Total population	Percent male	Percent female
Eglin	10,025	87.0	13.0
Chaffee	19,060	86.0	14.0
Indiantown Gap	19,094	79.0	21.0
McCoy	14,362	90.0	10.0
Total	62,541	84.9	15.1

Source: Cuban Haitian Task Force Monthly Reports, February 1981.

Resettlements

National voluntary agencies (volags) were responsible for resettling the Cuban entrants with no direct family ties in the United States. As of February 18, 1981, volags and other private organizations resettled 56,528 Cubans. Another 62,271 were resettled directly to relatives, some with volag assistance. The U.S. Catholic Conference was the primary agency of resettlement, followed by Church World Service, International Rescue Committee, World Relief Refugee Service, Lutheran Immigration Refugee Service, Southern Baptist Convention, American Council for Nationalities Service and the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society.

Destinations

Resettlements were highly concentrated in a few states, with 73 percent to Florida. Other areas receiving large numbers of Cubans included New Jersey, New York and California, all of which contained sizeable pre-Mariel Cuban populations (see Table 11).

Resettlements concentrated in large urban areas within the states. Of those settling in Florida, about 78 percent (or 57 percent of all resettlements) were in the Miami-Dade County area. The City of Miami received 46,224 persons and the City of Hialeah received another 18,765. Other cities in Florida receiving a major share of resettled Cubans are listed in Table 12.

The population of the camps

Most of the camp population were single men between 20 and 35 years of age. The average age was in the early thirties, with the women slightly older than the men. As a whole, Mariel emigrants were substantially younger than earlier cohorts of Cuban immigrants and more representative of the Cuban island population reported in the last prerevolutionary Cuban census (Bach 1981).

Table 11.—Resettlement of Mariel Cubans by State

State	Number	Percent
Florida	86,223	73.1
New Jersey	7,599	6.4
New York	5,970	5.1
California	4,920	4.2
Illinois	1,608	1.4
Texas	1,523	1.3
Pennsylvania	1,006	0.8
Puerto Rico	941	0.8
Wisconsin	905	0.8
Louisiana	786	0.7
Massachusetts	490	0.4
Subtotal	111,971	95.0
Other states	5,877	4.9
Other countries	69	0.1
Total	117,917	100.0

Source: Cuban-Haitian Task Force Monthly Reports, February 1981.

Table 12.—Resettlement of Mariel Cubans in Florida Cities, 1980

Florida city	Number	Percentage of Florida resettlements	Percentage of total resettlements
Miami	46,224	53.6	39.2
Hialeah	18,765	21.8	15.9
Tampa	1,299	1.5	1.1
Miami Beach	707	0.8	0.6
Carol City	611	0.7	0.5
West Palm Beach	467	0.5	0.4
Coral Gables	430	0.5	0.4
Key West	374	0.4	0.3
Orlando	335	0.4	0.3
Ft. Lauderdale	228	0.3	0.2
Hollywood	208	0.2	0.2
Total	69,648	80.7	59.1

Source: Cuban Haitian Task Force Monthly Reports, February 1981.

There were twice as many unmarried as married persons among the camp population, although 54 percent of the women were married compared to 31.5 percent of the men.

Table 13.—Sex and Marital Status of Cuban Entrants at the Resettlement Camps Age 14 and Older, 1980

Marital status	Male		Female		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Eglin total	826	100.0	99	100.0	925	100.0
Single	552	66.8	56	56.6	608	65.7
Married	274	33.2	43	43.4	317	34.3
Chaffee total	1,484	100.0	203	100.0	1,687	100.0
Single	1,022	68.9	97	47.8	1,119	66.3
Married	462	31.1	106	52.2	568	33.7
Indiantown Gap total	1,370	100.0	322	100.0	1,692	100.0
Single	902	65.8	144	44.7	1,046	61.8
Married	468	34.2	178	55.3	646	38.2
McCoy total	1,282	100.0	109	100.0	1,391	100.0
Single	922	71.9	40	36.7	962	69.2
Married	360	28.1	69	63.3	429	30.8
All camps total	4,962	100.0	733	100.0	5,695	100.0
Single	3,398	68.5	337	46.0	3,735	65.6
Married	1,564	31.5	396	54.0	1,960	34.4

Source: Robert L. Bach, presentation to Population Association of America, 1981.

The Flotilla group was predominantly urban, with 66.3 percent of the population originating in the city and province of Havana, but origins vary among the resettlement camp migrants. Bach found a marked decrease over time in the proportion departing from Havana, from 89 percent of the Eglin population to 52 percent of those at McCoy.

An examination of the occupational status of the camp population should dispel several misconceptions about the entire Flotilla population. It reflects the economic problems of Cuba and its selection for emigration of persons whose occupational skills could not be assimilated in a saturated labor market. It also enables us to predict the eventual labor force participation of the refugees in the U.S. and especially South Florida (see Tables 14 and 15).

Table 14.—Principal Activity in Cuba of Cuban Entrants by Sex Age 16 and Older, 1980

Activity	Male		Female		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Employed	3,895	78.8	268	39.4	4,163	74.0
Unemployed	192	3.9	88	12.9	280	5.0
Out of labor market	856	17.3	325	47.7	1,181	21.0
Total	4,943	100.0	681	100.0	5,624	100.0

Source: Robert L. Bach, presentation to Population Association of America, 1981.

Table 15.—Principal Occupation in Cuba for Cuban Entrants at the Resettlement Camps Age 16 and Older, 1980

Occupation	Eglin		Chaffee		Indiantown Gap		McCoy		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Professional and technical	56	7.4	130	8.6	139	11.7	87	9.2	412	9.4
Manager, administrator	10	1.3	32	2.1	32	2.7	20	2.1	94	2.1
Sales	10	1.3	15	1.0	25	2.1	5	0.5	55	1.3
Clerical	44	5.8	74	4.9	78	6.5	24	2.5	220	5.0
Craft	170	22.5	402	26.5	284	23.8	255	26.8	1,111	25.3
Operative	115	15.2	243	16.0	156	13.1	164	17.3	678	15.4
Transport operative	82	10.8	166	10.9	131	11.0	102	10.7	481	11.0
Laborer	168	22.2	286	18.9	190	15.9	180	18.9	824	18.8
Farm labor	8	1.1	27	1.8	22	1.8	32	3.4	89	2.0
Farmer	2	0.3	20	1.3	21	1.8	20	2.1	63	1.4
Service	70	9.3	121	8.0	114	9.6	61	6.4	366	8.3
Total	735	100.0	1,516	100.0	1,192	100.0	950	100.0	4,393	100.0

Source: Robert L. Bach, presentation to Population Association of America, 1981.

Among the first arrivals recorded in Miami-Dade by the Cuban Refugee Program, only 18 percent of Bach's sample had been out of the Cuban labor market, compared to 21 percent of the camp population.

Seventy-four percent of the working-age camp population held an occupation for most of their adult lives in Cuba. Only 5 percent described themselves as unemployed during most of their lives and the great majority of those were housewives and students. Most of the refugees in Bach's camp samples came from an urban center, and their occupational backgrounds reflected urban skills.

Regarding the occupations among sampled camp refugees, Bach (1982) concludes that:

> The craftworkers, the single largest group, included mechanics that repaired factory equipment and automobiles, while others were brickmen and carpenters, roofers, painters, and electricians. The laborers worked most frequently in construction; others in factories or on the docks...heavy equipment operators dominated the operative category, with welders appearing most frequently. Professional and technical workers, of whom we have heard so little, actually comprised nearly 8-9 percent of the group. They included teachers from all grade levels, accountants, entertainers, urban planners, and nurses, to name only a few.

Bach says the employment backgrounds among working adults in the camp sample were concentrated in craft (25.3 percent), laborer (18.8 percent), machine operative (15.4 percent), and transport operative (11.0 percent) jobs. Farm laborers and farmers (2.0 percent and 1.4 percent) were under-represented in relation to the total Cuban source population.

Overall, the professional and skilled craft workers' employment backgrounds, far from suggesting the exodus of "lumpen proletariats," represent a population that was central to the Cuban economy. Moreover, Mariel refugee sociodemographics generally do not seem to differ significantly from those of Fourth Stage refugees.

Why then has there been so much negative publicity about the deviant, the marginal, the criminal? Bach (1982) found that 16 percent (911) of the sample camp population fourteen years of age and over (5,695) had been imprisoned in Cuban jails, for a variety of reasons ranging from food theft to violent felonies. A number of historically violent youths who were processed at Fort McCoy were shown to have had serious social and psychological problems, and it is on this evidence that the pejorative labels have been founded.

Unquestionably, a large number of Cubans were convicted felons whose crimes clearly made them detainable in the U.S. But other than the 1,800 incarcerated in federal prisons, there were significant numbers of persons whose past offenses in Cuba were either economic in nature or directed against the state. Persons who challenged the state by dodging military service, deserting, refusing to work for the state during the cane harvest, or participating in the black market, were commonly arrested and imprisoned in Cuban jails. Finally, there was a group of political prisoners whose prison terms began in the 1960s and who probably would have been released and allowed to come to the U.S. under the existing Refugee Act of 1980.

In summary, the Flotilla population was younger, had a greater proportion of blacks and mulattos, and more closely represented the source Cuban population than any previous migrant group. There were major differences between the Miami group and the camp population, however; a Miami arrival was more likely to be white, female and married.

Although most entrants were actively employed, there was a substantial amount of unemployment. The workers were drawn from urban manufacturing, construction and service sectors, where they worked in craft, laborer and operative jobs. The women who were out of the labor market were mostly homemakers and students. Although the economic origins of Mariel refugees are modest compared to those of the Cuban exiles of the 1960s, they are similar to those of the exiles that arrived before the end of the aerial bridge in 1973-1974.

Before discussing the impact of Cuban immigration, it is important to consider some summary comments about Mariel exiles in particular.

1. Assuming that only a small proportion, 10 percent to 20 percent (Bach's figure of 16 percent with jail histories), represent problem cases or deviants, criminals, mental problems and other unacceptable behaviors, that proportion would still include up to 25,000 persons, enough to wreak havoc with present community systems. This proportion nevertheless would represent only a small minority of the total Mariel population, most of whom are being indicted for "sins" of the minority.

2. The Mariel population possibly represents a group with less capability of support because they have fewer relatives and friends as well as low occupational and educational statuses, and have entered a labor market less able to support even its own citizenry. As the area's tourism industry has waned and international banking and commerce have strengthened, Miami-Dade's labor market has changed. In addition, present refugee assistance programs provide less support for the recent arrivals than for former Cuban refugees.

3. The Mariel population includes a significantly larger number of blacks which without doubt puts additional constraints upon acceptance in the community and labor market.

4. It is possible that the influence of twenty years of life in the U.S. on earlier arrivals makes it far more difficult for Mariels to accept and be accepted by pre-Mariel Cuban immigrants.

5. A significant factor is the failure of most Mariels to realize their high immediate expectations upon arrival in the "home of the free and land of opportunity." Crushed expectations do not lead to total support of the rules and policies of a society found to be disappointing.

Unfortunately, none of these considerations helps us unravel the mystery of the Mariels--we still need knowledge concerning both negative consequences and positive contributions.

The reasons behind the latest immigration stream from Cuba are varied and complex. Scholars and observers of Cuban immigration since the first arrivals in the sixties have proposed a series of socioeconomic and political theories which point to several years of deepening frustrations and severe problems in the country's major agricultural industries. These problems prevented the provision of adequate economic and educational opportunities for a young and rapidly growing labor force (Gonzalez and McCoy, 1980; Bach, 1980). The result, according to these theories, was a rising tide of restlessness and disaffection among Cubans with relatives in the U.S., especially following the return of 100,000 Cuban exiles in 1979 who were allowed to visit the island for the first time since the Cuban Revolution (Department of State July 1980, 80-81).

Chapter 6.—Impact of the Mariels on Miami-Dade County

Cuban-American reaction

Just months after the onset of the Cuban Flotilla, the authors predicted that the adjustment of the 125,000 new refugees would depend largely upon the Cuban-American community's absorptive capacity (McCoy and Gonzalez, 1980) and upon adequate planning by the federal government and its cooperation with state, county and city authorities in providing aid to both the refugees and the communities that would become their new homes. It is now possible to assess part of the impact of these predictions by looking at the reality of life in Miami-Dade County several years after the arrival of the first boat from Cuba.

The Cuban community's capacity to absorb the new refugees seemed high in early April 1980, just before the onset of the flotilla. When the news reached Miami that Cubans sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, the exile community quickly organized the collection of food, funds, medicines and clothing for their fellow Cubans. It is difficult to forget the street parades and demonstrations, the emotional speeches and rallies, and the seemingly endless radio and television announcements as the Cuban-American community celebrated that occasion. Immediately, Cuban-exile leaders began to seek support from Washington for the release of the 10,000 Cubans waiting inside the embassy compound.

Unfortunately, the arrival of the boatlift coincided with the early stages of increased ethnic polarization and tensions which were then attributed to demographic changes and increasing Latinization of the Miami-Dade area. Tensions among sectors of the community had been aggravated by such events as the repeal of a bilingual ordinance in Miami-Dade County, the racial riots in May of that year (Rivers and McCoy 1980), and the publication of sensational reports by the news media which focused on "the more spectacular traits and social characteristics presumed to be possessed by significant proportions of the refugees" (Aguirre 1980). The negative publicity was perhaps the most devastating obstacle facing the newly arrived refugees, especially following Castro's statements concerning the criminal records and mental health of a small number of them. The Cuban-American community feared discreditation of its standing in American society, and some turned this fear into apathy for the plight of the Mariels. The new refugees were both scorned and feared by many exiles, and the subsequent detention of half of the Mariel population further contributed to the negative public reaction and reception.

Federal response lacking

Prior to Mariel, the federal government had allocated $2.1 billion to programs of assistance for Cuban refugees between 1961 and 1976, and Miami-Dade County was able to accommodate the continuous flow of refugees from

Cuba due to expanding tourism and exports and rapidly growing garment and banking industries. The most notable example of federal responsibility for assistance to a geographical area in need of Cuban refugee aid was the establishment of a Cuban Refugee Emergency Center (CREC) in Miami.

Assistance to Cuban refugees in the U.S. started with the establishment of the CREC in December 1960, in direct response to an appeal for aid by the State of Florida (Prohias and Casal 1973, 102-115). On February 3, 1961, President Kennedy directed that a Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) be established under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to assume total responsibility for all costs associated with refugee assistance.

The CRP was created primarily to relieve Miami's overtaxed resources due to the influx of 277,901 Cuban refugees from 1961 to 1973 (Cuban Refugee Program Fact Sheet, April 30, 1971).

It is important to remember that all the following refugee assistance programs were handled by the federally funded CRP prior to the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. Since Mariel, financial responsibility for administration of the same programs has shifted increasingly to the state, local and private sectors.

Types of refugee assistance provided by the Cuban Refugee Program 1961-1973:

1. Financial assistance to state and local public agencies which provided services for substantial numbers of refugees.

2. Resettlement to communities throughout the U.S.

3. Health services.

4. Training, retraining and educational opportunities for persons with professional backgrounds.

5. Financial assistance for local public school operating costs.

6. Job opportunities and placement; transportation and adjustment costs in the destination city.

7. Distribution of surplus food and clothing.

8. Financial aid for unaccompanied children.

Financial assistance for basic maintenance in Miami-Dade and communities of resettlement was administered through federal, state and local channels, based on local standards. Original funds were assigned to the CRP by the President's Contingency Fund under the 1954 Mutual Security Act, as well as under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Permanent authority for the program was provided by the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, Public Law 87-510, that went into effect on June 28, 1962.

The Social Security Commission coordinated the federal aid effort until January 1963, when the CRP was placed under a newly formed Welfare Administration. In 1967, the CRP became a part of the Social and Rehabilitation

Service. Federal support of the CRP remained in effect throughout the three early waves of Cuban immigration to the U.S., from 1961 to the end of the aerial bridge in 1973, with partial funding continuing for several years.

The creation and maintenance of the Cuban Refugee Program highlights the fact that during the twenty-year period of pre-Mariel immigration, the federal government recognized its responsibility and role as full participant in the administration of Cuban immigration to the United States. Indeed, the successful adaptation of the early Cubans to the U.S. reflects a planned, comprehensive federal immigration policy.

A large and continuing influx of immigrants notwithstanding, the response by the federal government in recent years has been less than enthusiastic, and financial responsibility for assisting refugees has shifted from previous federal sources to the state and county levels. A report by the Bureau of Business Research at Florida International University (FIU) states that the government structure was ill-prepared to handle the sudden influx of persons from Cuba and Haiti, thus resulting in a lack of coordination and a lack of planning among federal, state and local agencies and the private sector (Luyjtes 1982).

The report further explains that Florida received only 46.4 percent of funds made available to the states between April 1980 and September 1981, and that the following net costs were incurred between those dates (Luyjtes 1982):

Dade County	$60.1 million
State of Florida	$23.0 million

In response to requests made by the Metro Dade County Commission, senators and congressmen regarding Metropolitan Dade County's fiscal posture, a report was prepared by the Office of the Dade County Manager in February 1985. The documentation in the White Paper reveals the shift in federal philosophy and funding from national to state and local units.

The paper points out that the few sources of federal funding provided since 1980 were obtained only after "long and arduous battles on the part of Florida's Senators and Congressmen, state and local leaders, and active involvement from the private sector." (Dade County Manager's Office 1985).

The information summarized in Table 16 shows the types of funds available for refugee assistance and highlights the enormous financial burden that was absorbed by Miami-Dade County in the aftermath of the Mariel exodus. In the five-year period following this latest influx, Metro Dade County has received $51,909,753 from the federal government, but it has incurred unreimbursed costs for services to refugees ranging from $41,802,713 to $45,654,433. The lack of a cohesive federal financial mechanism to deal with immigration emergencies is illustrated by the number of federal agencies which responded with partial funding or reimbursement for costs associated with the Mariel Boatlift (Dade County Manager's Office 1985).

One way of measuring the full impact of refugees on the Miami-Dade area is through an assessment of monetary costs to the city and county for services provided to the entrant and refugee population. Obtaining this kind of

Table 16.—Types of Funding Sources, Services and Unfunded Costs to Metropolitan Dade County Government, 1979-1985

	Type of funding	Description of service	Date	Unfunded balance ($)
I.	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	Reimbursement for extraordinary cost related to Mariel Boatlift and processing. Overtime, facilities, purchases, equipment, buses, supplies.	4/80-10/80	29,657
II.	Fascell/Stone Amendment retroactive reimbursement under Title V of Refugee Education Assistance Act	Reimbursement for cash, medical and social services provided to Cuban/Haitian entrants. General social services; i.e., child care, alchohol, drug abuse, placement, emergency cash assistance, primary health care.	10/79-1/81	0
III.	Fascell/Stone Amendment Public Health Service, Title V Refugee Education Assistance Act. impact aid, targeted assistance	Retroactive reimbursement, grant award providing direct reimbursement subject to availability of funds. Inpatient and outpatient health services.	10/79-12/84	11,452,968
IV.	Department of Justice reimbursement	Discretionary funds in the amount of $3 million allocated to state for reimbursement to local governments for documentable criminal justice-related expenditures; i.e., corrections costs, jail renovations, court costs, medical examiner costs.	10/79-1/81	1,349,953
V.	Impact aid	Grant to Dade County to diminish the impact of the cash and medical benefits cutoff; i.e., food assistance, housing vouchers health care, employment services.	6/82-9/83	0
VI.	Targeted assistance	Grant award to specific services to Dade County for entrant population; i.e., employment, health, social services, adult day care, child day care, mental health, children medical services, health care services, hospitalization, criminal justice.	10/83-9/84	NA
VII.	Emergency assistance	Cash assistance and/or special services (housing, clothing, etc.) to 11,786 entrants.	1982-1983	161,817
		Cash assistance and/or special services to 1,899 entrants.	1983-1984	181,326
VIII.	Criminal justice	Costs incurred by Dade County for incarceration of entrant inmates.	1984-1985	28,662,992-32,467,712
Total unfunded costs			1980-1985	41,802,713-45,645,433

NA Not available.
Source: Authors' compilation from Dade County Manager's Office, White Paper on Immigration, 1985.

information entails the cooperation of all the agencies involved, a task beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, the authors draw from published sources of information about the impact of the refugees including reports by FIU and the Dade County Grand Jury, the monthly statistical reports of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, other scholarly articles and journalistic accounts, as well as 1980 Census data.

Although not exhaustive, the following is a brief attempt at assessing the impact of refugees upon selected social services, which represents the larger share of all documented expenses incurred by Dade County.

Education, health, criminal justice and social services

The impact of immigrants upon the delivery of medical, educational, health and social services has been overwhelming. When the Carter administration created the status of "entrant," the approximately 150,100 Cubans and Haitians were thus declared ineligible to receive assistance that would have been provided to refugees under the auspices of the Refugee Act of 1980. Therefore, the thousands of entrants in need of financial, medical and social services relied upon the existing private and public agencies, causing a displacement of local clients and a financial problem to the agencies (Luyjtes 1982).

Social services comprise a broad series of programs available to Cuban entrants, including English as a second language, outreach and social-adjustment services and vocational assistance. At least forty-one social-service agencies and institutions offered help to Cuban entrants in 1980-81, with employment services most requested by the Cubans. However, emergency food, transportation, food stamps, health services and care for the elderly and children were provided to entrants during this period (Luyjtes 1982).

Data obtained by the FIU research team indicate that 12,498 Cuban entrants received alcohol and mental health counseling and related services between 1980 and 1981. The information is considered understated because past studies on Miami-Dade's Cuban population have shown that the immigration experience and its corollaries of family disruption, downward social mobility and other adjustment stresses were important in determining the nature and extent of immigrants' incidence of stress reactions (Szapocznick 1977, Gonzalez 1979 and 1980). Therefore, it is probable that entrants will continue to need mental health and related services. The somewhat hostile reception at the time of arrival, the perilous voyage by sea, the long periods of detention and deportation insecurity will continue to generate stressful obstacles to the successful adjustment of Cubans, Haitians and other refugees.

Miami-Dade County's public school system, the second largest in the nation, was able to absorb nearly 19,000 foreign students with virtually no disruption to its curriculum during the aftermath of the Mariel influx in 1980 (see Tables 17 and 18). There is evidence, in fact, that Mariel and other foreign-born children are adjusting well to the school environment (see Luyjtes 1982; Rothchild 1985).

Table 17.—Enrollment in Dade County Schools, 1970, 1979 and 1980

Year	Black		Hispanic		White		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
1970	61,142	25.5	49,379	20.6	129,737	54.0	240,258
1979	67,644	30.0	76,054	33.7	82,041	36.3	225,739
1980	68,808	29.6	87,548	37.7	76,077	32.7	232,433

Note: Does not include students enrolled in private schools, which are heavily attended by Hispanics and Whites. Cuban students account for 80 percent of the Hispanic student population.

Table 18.—Foreign Student Enrollment in Dade County Schools
April 28, 1980-September 18, 1981
(Grades K through 12)

	Number	Percent
Cubans	16,157	85.3
Haitians	1,463	7.7
Nicaraguans	1,131	5.9
Other immigrants	183	1.0
Total	18,934	100.0

Source: Jan B. Luytjes, The Economic Impact of Refugees in Dade County, Bureau of Business Research, Florida International University, 1982.

The sudden arrival of so many thousands of Cuban and other refugees in 1980 dictated the need for 600 new teachers and additional facilities and led to an increased demand for certified bilingual teachers. Fortunately, Dade County was equipped with a well-established, federally funded bilingual program which had facilitated the linguistic, academic and cultural integration of thousands of Cuban immigrant children since their first arrival in the 1960s (University of Miami 1967).

Operated by the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Jackson Memorial Hospital (JMH) has treated the largest number of refugees and has provided most entrants with the only health-care services readily available to them (see Table 19). The major impact of refugees upon the delivery of health care services at JMH, in addition to financial services, has been the need for more interpreters and more obstetrical and infant-care services.

The federal response to Miami-Dade County's plea for more resources to treat a growing population has been inadequate. While JMH does receive some federal reimbursement for aliens who are registered with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, there is no such reimbursement for undocumented (and therefore illegal) aliens who are treated at public expense at the hospital.

Table 19.—Costs Incurred by Jackson Memorial Hospital, 1979-1981

Ethnic group	Number of visits	Total costs
Haitians	12,411	$ 7,413,211
Cubans	14,552	9,594,447
Nicaraguans	2,330	1,284,375
Total	29,293	$18,232,033
Reimbursed		12,280,869
Deficit		$ 5,951,164

Source: Jan B. Luyjtes, The Economic Impact of Refugees in Dade County, Bureau of Business Research, Florida International University, 1982.

Housing problems

An immediate impact on housing availability occurred with the arrival of the Cuban refugees in 1980-81, when the rental vacancy rate in Miami-Dade County was less than one-half of 1 percent. According to one survey, only 9 percent of the Cuban refugees lived in an apartment or house paid for by themselves, while 91 percent lived with relatives, friends or at facilities of religious organizations in the Cuban community (Lasaga 1980). The sudden influx created strains and pressures on the nuclear Cuban family by adding kinfolk or newly arrived friends (McCoy et al. 1980). Reunification failures often resulted in forced or voluntary resettlement of thousands of refugees into low-rent hotel rooms, boarding homes or apartments. Even the Orange Bowl stadium served as temporary shelter for the homeless until the Dolphins began a new football season, which prompted the hasty creation of Tent City, a minicamp built overnight under a major interstate highway in the Little Havana area of Miami-Dade. Tent City became a stop-gap home for 4,000 unrelocated and jobless refugees.

Lack of housing and the necessity of screening new arrivals dictated the rise of processing centers and the utilization of five resettlement camps in different states, which became responsible for relocating about 62,000 Cuban entrants. National voluntary agencies were responsible for resettling those held in detention camps, and another half of the Cuban entrant population went to live with relatives upon arrival in Miami-Dade County.

Resettlements were highly concentrated in a few states, particularly Florida, following a distribution pattern similar to that of Cuban-Americans already living in the United States. Nearly 80 percent of all Cuban entrants resettled in the south Florida areas. (Probably a greater percentage of the 62,000 earliest arrivals settled in Miami-Dade with relatives, but data are not available on those who were released without long detainments in camps or otherwise.) The Miami-Dade MSA in particular received the largest number of formerly detained Cuban entrants. Other areas receiving large numbers were New Jersey, New York and California.

Media coverage and the grand jury report

The media conveyed to the public grim tales of violence allegedly attributed to the influx of Cuban criminals transported directly from Cuban jails to Miami-Dade via the boatlift. However, a recent report by the Grand Jury of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Miami-Dade County (1982) states that the crime increase attributed to Mariel refugees has been somewhat overestimated, while the crime increase attributable to other, probably illegal, aliens has been considerably underestimated.

Perhaps the single most significant statement about the refugees can be found on page 11 of that report, which states: "The overwhelming majority of Mariel refugees in our community have had no contact with our criminal justice system....Mariel entrants, collectively, are making a very real and laudable attempt to assimilate themselves into this community....The crisis of Mariel and its aftermath are, for the most part, behind us."

The investigations of the Grand Jury concentrated on the activities of a relatively small group of Mariel refugees, the outcasts of Castro's jails and mental hospitals, who had not assimilated and in many instances had committed violent crimes which were reported in the media. Of those Mariel refugees arrested, a very violent and dangerous minority was identifiable. However, the report also found that the Immigration and Naturalization Service expressed an inability to identify or assume responsibility for this discernible minority of dangerous Mariels.

Table 20 indicates clearly that pre-Mariel Cubans are much less underrepresented in arrest statistics whereas other sub-groups in addition to the Mariels are overrepresented, and therefore suggests that to condemn an entire group based on the acts of a minority who were transported here from Cuban jails "and criminal lifestyles, would be irresponsible."

Table 20.—Dade County Population Composition and Arrest Population, 1982

Ethnic Group	Percent of Dade County population	Percent of arrest population
U.S. Whites	38	27
U.S. Blacks	16	35
Pre-Mariel Cubans	32	9
Mariel Cubans	7	16
Other Latin or Caribbean	7	13
Total	100	100

Source: Authors' compilation from Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Final Report of the Grand Jury on Immigration and Narcotic Interdiction, 1982.

Immigration since Mariel

Since the end of the Mariel Boatlift marks the completion of another stage of immigration for Cubans, what will be the next stage and what has happened in terms of Cuban immigration since October 1980 when the Mariel period ended?

Three major categories of immigration status will determine, for the most part, the number of legal Cuban immigrants to the U.S. over the decade of the eighties. Undoubtedly, the most dramatic long-term consequence for Cuban immigration will be the recent change in legal status allowing Mariel refugees to register for eligibility for U.S. citizenship. It is estimated that this would permit residency status to as many as 300,000 new Cuban arrivals, spouses and unmarried children in the U.S. over the next several years.

The Cuban National Planning Council estimates that close to 90,000 eligible immigrants have registered to date. They also estimate that approximately 100 Cubans a week immigrate either directly from Cuba or from third countries. This would imply that since October 1980 approximately 25,000 Cubans have arrived in South Florida to begin the new and most recent stage of Cuban immigration. How quickly the 25,000 could increase to several hundred thousand cannot yet be determined.

Two other factors could also affect the immigration picture:

a. any agreements between the U.S. and Cuba that would allow immigrant preference visas to Cubans living in Cuba (under a suspended 1984 agreement as many as 20,000 a year would be permitted);
b. the immigration of political refugees and their families who would not be counted under any other quota system (potentially several thousand a year).

These three separate categories of legal immigrants could, in the latter 1980s, account for as many newcomers annually as has been estimated for the total period from Mariel to the end of 1985 (21,000 to 25,000). These new conditions, assuming some eventual continuity in immigrant agreements between Cuba and the U.S., would begin to simulate the third stage of immigration, the Freedom Flights.

Progress of Cuban immigrants

Linked to Latin America by cultural and business ties, Miami/Dade has become an important center for international trade, banking and tourism for Latin Americans, Caribbeanites and Americans (Strategy Research Corporation 1980). The Cuban-American community has made substantial progress in local industries. Today, after more than two decades of settlement in Miami-Dade County, there are 21 Latin-owned banks and 18,000 Latin-owned businesses. Latins are also largely responsible for the booming international trade that is so important to the area (Arboleya 1980, The Miami Herald July 5, 1982). Most recently, Cuban political influence is evidenced by the election of Cubans to important positions in the City of Miami and other municipalities in

Dade County. Cubans have also won recent but very significant representation in the state legislature.

A renewed interest in the arts among the Cuban-American community also has recently surfaced, possibly arising from the recognized work of talented artists who came from Mariel. Actors, painters, dancers and many others are bringing the folklore of Cuba to the exile community and in doing so are fulfilling the exiles' need to hear, see and enjoy things that emanate from their native land.

A new wave of Cuban writers, poets and essayists also has contributed to the pool of local exile literature. Cuban exiles actively support the literary arts, and at least two publishing houses and a score of Spanish-language bookstores and libraries are found in Miami. "Tertulias," informal social gatherings whose primary purpose is the reading and discussion of new written works by authors and a small group of colleagues, friends and interested persons, have experienced a rebirth since Mariel. The presence and enthusiasm of young articulate writers has revitalized the exile community's interest in political and socioeconomic analyses of contemporary Cuba.

Possibly one of the most significant contributions of the Mariel immigration to the Cuban exile community has been the reinforcement of the Spanish language. For twenty years, Cuban exiles and their children increasingly adopted a bilingual mode of communication to adjust to American society. It is a well-known fact that Cuban-American children for the most part neither read nor write in their native language, Spanish. However, the influx of the Mariel Spanish-speaking persons, many of whom live with bilingual relatives and friends, has undoubtedly heightened the use of Spanish as the primary language between Mariel Cubans and their exile counterparts.

The retention of the Spanish language and other social/cultural traditions and values of the Cubans has raised a question as to the impact of Cubans upon traditional American cultural values compared with other immigrant groups. Do Cubans in fact represent a variant from the traditional melting-pot thesis of American society? Do the Cubans evidence more than any other group today the principle of cultural pluralism? Do they represent a variant by having retained more of their original culture and traditions because of their extreme concentration and size? Will the Cubans actually set a different standard of adaptation to American culture by retaining more elements of their Cuban heritage for a longer period of time than other immigrant groups?

There certainly is some evidence that the Cubans have been very successful at retaining the language, religion, foods and other elements of their original culture. One popular journalist calls this aspect of the Miami area a very positive contribution. Michael Harrington, writing in Signature, bestowed upon Miami the honor of being one of the world's cosmopolitan cities because of her Latin influence:

> The Miami area is one of the most sophisticated and cosmopolitan in the United States. It is for instance, the only city in the United States which contains a complete foreign city. By that I don't mean that Little Havana [a large Cuban community in Miami] is like the

> French Quarter in New Orleans, which is hardly French at all, or even like New York's Little Italy where the old country still flavors an American scene. Little Havana is not a neighborhood with some restaurants and special food shops; it is a foreign city in the literal sense of the phrase. (Cited in McCoy 1980.)

There is little doubt that the image of Miami has been totally changed by the Cuban influence; whereas, Miami-Dade used to be known, because of its Northeastern migrants, as "the furtherest South one could go and still be in New York City" it is now jokingly seen as "the most northern suburb of Havana." While many people have seen this influence as a negative stigma for Miami-Dade, others such as Harrington see positive contributions.

But even given the strong retention of so many cultural elements from the original Cuban society, does the Cuban population in Miami really represent a population that is antithetical to the melting-pot thesis? Even the Cubans feel the great pressure exerted upon all immigrant groups to become "Americanized," especially to certain political, educational and cultural values and even in that most significant area of language.

The evidence of the melting pot at work among the Cubans is most apparent among the young people and in the schools. After initial pairing of Spanish-speaking students with English-speaking students, all classes and all books are in English, except for a few specially funded bilingual classes. Few of the Cuban youth in Miami can actually read Spanish, as most of them have been taught to read English in school. Although they retain a type of bilingual culture within their homes, they are much more dependent upon English than Spanish. Therefore, the Cubans seem little different from other immigrant groups in that the public school system has been for them, too, the great equalizer. Recently, a popular journalist's account of the "Miami Melting Pot" illustrated this principle and captured the essence of the immigrant flavor of South Florida.

> Assimilation is how America re-creates itself: by merging new waves of outside cultures. The apotheosis was at Ellis Island. Today, the newest Americans come to the South....In a single summer the Mariel boatlift delivered a mass of newcomers to Miami's shores equal to nearly one third of the city's entire population. Haitians still wade in from scuttled and unseaworthy vessels, Colombians fly in, Nicaraguans drive in via Mexico to escape their left-wing government. Two decades ago there were Cuban airlifts, and a decade before that the Bronx and Chicago carlifts brought a steady supply of Yankees escaping cold weather. Over the past thirty years Miami has absorbed more immigrants per capita than any other American city. Miami is two hundred years of New England compressed into fifty: people hardly settle down long enough to learn about mildew and hurricanes before they are thought of as forefathers by more recent arrivals, who themselves are rendered obsolete in a boatlift or two. Huge incursions make foreigners of the erstwhile natives. Erstwhile natives either migrate up to Fort Lauderdale or stay and speculate: When will all these outsiders ever fit in?

> Miami High (School) is the essence of Miami's present and perpetual condition: the outsiders taking over, the erstwhile natives estranged. And yet, is there not something reassuringly familiar here? The second floor is called the Marielito floor; more seasoned immigrants occupy the third and the first. The important distinctions are early Cuban versus late Cuban, Nicaraguan versus Colombian. The Cuban establishment wonders of these late arrivals: Will they ever fit in?" (Rothchild 1985.)

Rothchild's tongue-in-cheek verbal play with the question of whether they will "fit in" has been a very serious question in Miami and has even contributed to what the media have called "white flight," meaning a movement of the Anglo population to escape the Cuban influence. However, when viewed in historical perspective, are these latest immigrants any more or less different than those who came earlier? After all, only one-third of those living in Florida are native Floridians (see McCoy and Gonzalez 1982); and most can trace their ancestors to another country in the not-too-distant past. After a couple of generations will not the Cubans "fit in" just as those who came before them learned to fit in?

Chapter 7.—Summary and Conclusions

The present and future status of Hispanics in the United States demands greater attention and concern because of their numbers, which will surely continue to increase because of the demographic, economic and political conditions of the origin countries. These "push" factors for immigration are combined with the "pull" of political and economic opportunities in the United States. However, concern for these latest immigration issues that translate into policies of the United States governments is not shared equally.

These immigrants are concentrated in a few selected destinations, mainly South and Southwestern metropolitan areas. The Cubans represent the Hispanic concentration in Florida, mainly in Miami-Dade County. Our research illustrates the importance of understanding this new immigration both for appreciation of the newest arrivals as well as for realizing the necessity for changes in immigration policy.

We believe that the Mariel Boatlift of 1980 must be placed in its proper historical perspective through an understanding of the role South Florida played in the 1960s as a favored destination for domestic and international tourism and later as the gateway of the Americas and a major center for business and financial industries. The Miami-Dade area in particular offered many opportunities for expanding Latin American business and tourism interests in the United States.

Although Cubans are now heavily concentrated in South Florida, the thousands who came to the U.S. as early as 1850 settled in not one but several widely dispersed communities. The economic opportunities that attracted the nineteenth-century Cubans included the tobacco and cigar industries in New York and New Jersey, Tampa and Key West. Cattle ranching also flourished among Cuban immigrants living in Florida from 1850 to 1900.

With the industrialization and urbanization of South Florida between 1920 and 1960, the destination of Cuban immigrants began to shift from the previous locations to Miami-Dade. It became the mecca for thousands of enterprising young men and women who sought prosperity in real estate, tourism, banking and many small businesses. The further development of Miami-Dade into a vibrant center for tourism and trade also created a demand for labor which coincided with a period of increasing political instability in Cuba in the late 1950s.

In light of this, and not surprisingly, many of the Cuban exiles who settled in Miami-Dade during this period of rapid economic growth started and maintained successful businesses and service agencies which continue today. This legacy of economic vitality continues to contribute greatly to South Florida's stature as an important city of the world, as evidenced by the large number of new residents who make South Florida their home each year.

Therefore, even though many early Cubans had settled in other areas prior to Castro's takeover in 1959, post-Castro Cubans fled to Miami-Dade because of its economic development as well as for its geographic proximity to Cuba. Concomitant with the economic growth of Miami-Dade was the arrival of significant numbers of retirees from the American northeast, blacks in search of jobs, and Latin and Caribbean immigrants and tourists who generated a demand for services that a growing labor market was able to satisfy. This multiethnic influx established the presence of a heterogeneous population which later set the stage for transformation of South Florida into a culturally diverse community.

Our aim has been to show that the Cuban immigration to South Florida was one of several migrations of ethnically diverse peoples who sought new lives in a new land. In this sense, the Cuban immigration differs little from other immigrations into the new America of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The present concentration of Cubans in Florida notwithstanding, there is evidence that Cubans will begin to resettle in other areas gradually. Those places where they have already settled could also attract future Cuban arrivals. Large Cuban communities exist in five states besides Florida: New Jersey, New York, California, Illinois and Texas. Even though Cubans are viewed as the predominant Hispanic group in Florida, census figures for 1980 reveal that each major Hispanic group is concentrated into one or two states and in selected urban areas. As a matter of fact, each of the top-ranking states for any one major Hispanic group also ranks in the top ten for the other Hispanic groups.

Not only are Hispanics concentrated by states but they are distributed among a few specific urban centers, namely the metropolitan areas of Miami, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Chicago. Therefore, Florida is not unique and several other large states share with it equal concern about the impact of immigration and immigration policy.

The immigration of Cubans into Florida and the U.S. during the twenty-one years following the Cuban revolution in 1959 was almost uninterrupted even in times of strict travel restrictions. The effect of cultural continuity upon the exile community in Miami-Dade has been to further the retention and reinforcement of Cuban cultural patterns, values and beliefs.

Demographically, each of the six identifiable waves of Cuban immigration to the U.S. following Castro's rise to power reflects a certain degree of diversity in socioeconomic status and other social indicators among the different refugee cohorts. While many of the first to leave Cuba belonged to the elite power structure of former President Batista's government, subsequent refugees began to reflect a cross-section more representative of Cuban society. The most recent and controversial influx of Cubans in 1980 contributed to this process, as evidenced by the Cuban government's selective deportation of significant proportions of the disgruntled Cuban working classes, racial subgroups and young people, many of whom had been raised under Castro's government.

A major part of this work has been devoted to demythologizing the unwarranted negative image of the Mariel immigrants. We hope we have

succeeded by presenting empirical data on the Mariel population from responsible researchers and agencies. We also hope that it becomes clear to others, as it has to us, that the media coverage of the Mariels has tended to overemphasize certain traits, namely mental illness and criminal activities, which characterized only a very small proportion of them. Unfortunately, the stigma attached to the Mariels, together with the untimely rise in social tensions among certain sectors of the Miami-Dade population, made the withdrawal of federal support that much more a deterrent to acceptance of the Mariels in their new home as the burden of aid fell disproportionately upon the limited resources of the local government and service agencies.

The federal government's philosophy of the 1980s has been in stark contrast to its active role in refugee assistance during the 1960s and 1970s. In response to the lack of federal aid for immigration emergencies during the Mariel and Haitian boatlifts, the Dade County Manager's Office issued the following poignant statements:

> Prior to 1980, the federal government recognized its role as one which was fully responsible for the effects of a stated federal policy. Provisions were made to assist newly arrived immigrants during both the 1959-1962 Exodus and the Freedom Flights which took place between 1965-1973. Care and concern was shown to the new arrivals as well as a federal financial commitment made to assure that the State and local governments would not be required to assume a significant financial burden.
>
> Over the years, and as a result of orderly immigration, effective resettlement, and financial assistance, a support system for the newly arrived immigrants was established and kept in place until 1980.
>
> Prior to the Mariel Boatlift, mutual benefit was received by both the refugees and the existing resident community. In stark contrast, the Mariel boatlift was handled amid confusion, with the federal financial commitment being secured only after numerous legislative battles. More significant was the philosophy, shared by both administrations, that Mariel was not a federal responsibility. As a result, both the Mariel entrants and the community have been disillusioned, and a permanent stigma regarding new immigration into Dade County has been created (White Paper on Immigration 1985, 2,16).

In reaction to the Mariel Boatlift, numerous federal agencies responded with partial funding or reimbursement for costs. However, even that federal aid did not cover costs for services supplied by Miami-Dade in the five years since 1980. Total unreimbursed costs for refugee assistance have been documented to exceed $47,000,000 (Ibid, 12).

If the federal government has neglected its role as provider of support for financial aid to areas besieged by international immigration emergencies, it has nonetheless assumed full responsibility in matters of immigration policy and negotiation:

In the area of immigration policy, the federal branch assumes the role of sole responsible agent, disregarding the fact that the ultimate responsibility for service delivery is left up to the local and/or State jurisdiction. In fact, it oftentimes appears as though the federal branch of government views its responsibility as solely in the area of policy, negotiating and reaching final decisions in a vacuum, without local input, and once these decisions have been made, viewing any other responsibility as State or local in nature.

To address the issue more specifically, both the State of Florida in general, and Miami-Dade County in particular, have found themselves in the unenviable posture of responding to federal immigration decisions of which they become aware through reading the paper or watching the news (Ibid, 13).

Finally, it is particularly important to note, that the funding that was provided since 1980 has not come as a result of an aggressive federal policy which exemplifies the federal government as the responsible entity for immigration. Rather, each appropriation and legislative initiative has been won as a result of long and arduous battles on the part of Florida's Senators and Congressmen, State and local leaders, and active involvement from the private sector. The struggle continues even now, with funding allocations, program directions and implementation, and policy initiatives directed by the federal government creating difficulties at the local level (Ibid, 5).

Lessons to be learned from the Cuban immigration experience must include the realization that both host society and immigrants have benefited in the past from adequate federal support and coordination of immigration matters. One need only look at the very positive contributions and inroads made by former immigrants in the Miami-Dade area to realize that its vitality and success as a center for international commerce and tourism can be attributed in great part to the immigration philosophy of federal support and active participation in refugee assistance.

The present research emphasizes the tremendous financial cost of immigration and illustrates the impact on local areas that has been shifted from traditional federal responsibility. The data also point out why other political constituencies do not wish to become embroiled in a "no win" political and economic battle over immigration. Since immigration impacts only a few specific areas like Florida, Texas and California, and a few metropolitan areas like Miami-Dade within those states, the political interests are fragmented. The immigration debate points up so many dilemmas and unpleasant choices that political inaction by most "noninterested" groups, states, etc., places increasing demands upon the few areas that must deal with all the social, legal, political and economic impacts of refugees and immigrants.

Since Cuban immigration highlights the issues of all Hispanic and other recent immigrations, the social, political and economic implications of immigration must become a concern of the national and international communities, not just of the particular areas impacted so greatly. Not only have local and state political constituencies practiced "benign neglect," but even the federal government, which had shown greater responsibility before the Mariel immigration, is following what seems to be most prudent politically, avoiding as

much as possible a national confrontation on the whole immigration issue. This posture forces greater social and economic burdens upon states like Florida and local areas like Miami-Dade County. Even the State of Florida, except for appealing for federal responsibility and payment for immigration, has shown less concern and political support than local areas like Dade County see as necessary to develop a coalition to confront the real political, economic and social fallouts from our present lack of immigration policy and economic supports.

Forging an effective immigration policy will be left to states like Florida, which must lead out of their own self-interest to assure that Congress and the federal administration assume their legitimate responsibility for control and partial funding of international policy regarding immigration and refugees.

There is little doubt that the history of Cuban immigration into Florida presents the background from which immigration policy must be understood and changed. This policy must include both the right of American citizens to determine and limit population growth and the long-term international right of noncitizens to seek entry and opportunities in the United States. Demographic and economic conditions in the international community today do not allow for the approach taken in the past that permits unchecked entry of any who wish to cross our borders, but neither will the international community, nor should American citizens, allow America to close its doors to any entry by people from other nations. Determining equitable and just measures for legislating and enforcing such policy remains one of the greatest challenges confronting the international community today.

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